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THIN CAPITALIZATION: SOME CURRENT
QUESTIONS*
BoRis I. BrrrKER**

Since 1946, when the Supreme Court in deciding two hybrid
security cases, John Kelley Company v. Commissioner and Talbot Mills
v. Commissioner,' said that "we need not consider the effect of extreme situations such as nominal stock investments and an obviously excessive debt structure," the thin incorporation problem has been a
favorite subject of commentators.2 Many tax lawyers seem to be teachers without classrooms; but, even taking into account their penchant
for speculating in public, the many articles on thin incorporation
have been erected on a remarkably thin foundation of decided cases.
Indeed, so authoritative a source as the Federal Income Tax Project
of the American Law Institute could say, as recently as 1954, that a
limitation on the amount of indebtedness held pro rata by shareholders
"is not a part of present law," except for Isidor Dobkin3 and George
L. Sogg,4 and that these cases "would seem to be contrary to the weight
of prior authority." 5 Prior authority is authoritative only as long as
it is followed, however, and there have been enough thin incorporation
cases in the last two years to shatter the conclusion that Dobkin and
Sogg can be dismissed as momentary aberrations. These later cases
go far toward establishing a doctrine of thin capitalization,6 but by

*Reprinted, with revisions, from the December 1956 Issue of TAXES-THE TAX
MAGAZINE.

**B.A. 1938, Cornell University; LL.B. 1941, Yale University; Author of FEDERAL
GrFT TAXATION; Professor of Law, Yale University.
1326 U.S. 521, 526 (1946).
2For citations see Treusch, Corporate Distributions and Adjustments: Recent
Case Reminders of Some Old Problems Under the New Code, 32 TAXES 1023, 1029,
n.85 (1954); Note, Thin Capitalizationand Tax Avoidance, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1054
(1955).
315 T.C. 31, aff'd per curiam, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1950).
-9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 927 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1952).
INCOME, ESTATE AND

sAMERICAN LAW INsTrrrUTE, 2 FEDERAL INCOME TAX STATUTE 231-32 (Feb. 1954

Draft).
6E.g., The Colony, Inc., 26 T.C. No. 3 (1956); B. P. Gale, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
518 (1956); 241 Corporation, 15 CCHI Tax Ct. Mem. 901 (1956); Two-L Realty Co:, 14
CCHI Tax Ct. Mem. 1147 (1955). In these and literally dozens of other cases in the
last two years the Tax Court has emphasized the ratio of debt to stock, in disallowing deductions for interest, in treating repayments of "debt" as dividends to the

[25]

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol10/iss1/2

2

Bittker: Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

themselves they hardly supply a pretext, let alone a warrant, for still
another article on the subject. There have been other developments
in this area, however, that call for further study.
Before turning to these recent developments, it may be helpful
to review briefly the operation of the thin corporation doctrine. Assume that A and B are about to organize a manufacturing corporation
that they believe will require $100,000 for the purchase of machinery,
equipment, and inventory and to finance its operations for the first
few months. If A and B pay the $100,000 into the corporation for stock,
and it prospers, a repayment of any part of their investment will be
taxed to them as ordinary income. This will be true whether the corporation pays them the sum in question as a regular dividend or goes
through the more elaborate procedure of redeeming a portion of their
stock on a pro rata basis. 7 If, on the other hand, A and B pay only
$50,000 for their stock and lend another $50,000 to the corporation whether on open account or evidenced by notes, bonds, or debentures
- a repayment of the loan will be a nontaxable return of capital.
Moreover, interest paid by the corporation on the loan will be deductible," whereas no deduction is allowed the corporation for dividends paid to its shareholders.
recipients, in denying bad-debt deductions, and the like. The fact that inadequate
capital is often accompanied by other hallmarks militating against a finding of bona
fide indebtedness, thus permitting the Tax Court to rest its decisions on all the
facts or on alternative grounds, does not reduce the importance of the ratio of debt
to stock. The ratio of debt to stock has been thought to be crucial, however, only if
the debt is held pro rata by the shareholders or if variations in their holdings are
either quantatively minor or mitigated by family relationships.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has resisted the burgeoning thin corporation doctrine; in its view advances by shareholders to their corporation cannot
be converted from loans into contributions to capital if "there is no evidence of an
intent to make a contribution to capital other than the ratio between debt and stated
capital." Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1955). By itself the
Rowan case might be set down to inept pleading by the government - the court
of appeals thought that the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment should have
been granted because the government, relying mainly on a revenue agent's affidavit
that referred to the advances as debts, failed to raise a substantial issue of fact. But
the court itself has not construed it so narrowly; see Sun Properties, Inc. v. United
States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
7Ordinarily a pro rata redemption of stock will be taxed as a dividend to the
extent of the corporation's earnings and profits under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§302 (d); see Bittker, Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the In(1957).
ternal Revenue Code of 1954......... STAN. L. REv - -----SINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §163 (a).
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With these incentives, it is not surprising that shareholders of
closely held corporations now customarily split their investments between equity capital, represented by common and preferred stock,
and loans, represented by open accounts, bonds, debentures, and
notes, instead of casting their entire investment in the form of stock
or contributions to capital. Nor is it surprising that there is a tendency to increase the loan component of the investment at the expense of equity capital. There are nontax pressures at work as well,
of course; if the corporation fails the shareholders may be able to
salvage something on their loans to the corporation, whereas nothing
can be paid on their stock investments until creditors have been satisfied. On the other hand, shareholders who reduce their equity investments in order to increase their loans to the corporation may jeopardize the corporation's credit standing. Moreover, if the shareholders' stock investment is too thin, the courts may refuse to treat
the loans as true corporate debts. In bankruptcy, for example, a
corporation's debts to its shareholders may be subordinated to the
claims of outside creditors; if so, the shareholders are no better off than
if they had made their entire investment in the form of stock at the
outset.9 In recent years, especially since the Supreme Court's reference
in the Kelley and Talbot Mills cases to "nominal stock investments and
an obviously excessive debt structure," the courts in deciding federal
income tax cases have followed the bankruptcy courts in holding
that, if a corporation is too thin, debts to its shareholders will not be
treated as bona fide.
Thus, if A and B organize their corporation with stock of $1,000
par or stated value and debts of $99,000, the courts would almost
certainly treat the alleged debts as a disguised investment in stock or
as a contribution to capital. The principal consequences of disregarding these debts would be:
(1) Payments by the corporation for the use of the $99,000
would be treated as nondeductible dividends rather than as
deductible interest payments.
(2) A repayment of the $99,000 would be a taxable dividend to
the shareholders (to the extent of the corporation's earnings
and profits) rather than a nontaxable return of capital.
(8) If the corporation should fail, the worthless claim of
$99,000 could not be deducted as a bad debt under section
9See note 38 infra.
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166 (a) or 166 (d). Instead, it would be treated as part of
the cost of the shareholder's stock, to be deducted under
section 166 (g) when the stock becomes worthless.
With this background, 10 several problems in the application of
the thin corporation doctrine that have come to the fore in recent
years can be examined.
COMPUTING THE RATIO

So far no court has ventured to set out the criteria of the excessive
debt structure mentioned in the Kelley case."1 A mechanical test is
impossible, of course, since what is excessive for one industry may be
normal for another; even within a single industry no two corporations
are the same. But the ratio of debt to stock is at least a gross measure
of abnormality, and it would probably be generally agreed today that
a ratio of 1,000 to one is so extreme, no matter what the industry, that
only the most remarkable countervailing circumstances would permit
a finding of bona fide indebtedness. 12 Contrariwise, it would probably
be assumed by all that a ratio of two to one is a hallmark of au13
thenticity even for a risky business.
When we speak of a ratio of 1,000 to one, what are we comparing?
In the Dobkin case the organizers of a corporation paid in $28,000
in cash, for which they received promissory notes in the face amount
of $26,000 and stock with a par or stated value of $2,000. The cor1oFor a more detailed discussion see Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital Structures:
How Thin Is Too Thin?, 5 U. FLA. L. REv. 355 (1952).

-lFor an excellent discussion of this subject see Note, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 1054
(1955).
12
1n a few cases shareholder obligations that seemed to be excessive in amount
have been accepted at face value by the courts because third persons so treated them,
e.g., George J. Schaefer, 24 T.C. 638 (1955), rev'd, 240 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1957);
John Wrather, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 345 (1955).
13The fact that debt is not excessive in relation to stock does not insure its
recognition as such; there may be other indicia that it is not bona fide. In saying
that a ratio of two to one is not excessive the author recognizes that even this
amount of debt may be unusual in industrial corporations. See Silberman, How
Much Can Business Borrow?, 53 Fortune 131, 155-56 (1956), stating that a corporation with $78,000,000 of debt against $27,000,000 in preferred stock and $30,000,000
in equity has "a debt structure that would frighten most companies," that debt of
two to one is "particularly high debt," and that a corporation with 51% debt is a
"very heavy borrower." But the fact that a capital structure may be unsound in the
eyes of Wall Street does not necessarily transform its debt into stock for tax purposes
any more than for other purposes.
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poration then purchased an apartment building for approximately
$72,000, paying about $28,000 in cash and either assuming or taking
subject to outstanding first and second mortgages aggregating about
$44,000.14 In finding a thirty-five to one ratio of indebtedness to
capital stock-total debt of $70,000 and stock of $2,000- the Tax
Court took the first and second mortgages into account. 5 The equity
was dangerously thin, whether the corporation assumed the mortgages
or merely took the property subject to them. If in fact the corporation
did not assume the mortgages, however, the notes would have been
a bit less speculative. This could hardly have made any difference
on the Dobkin facts, of course, but in other circumstances it might
be important. If the corporation had issued $18,000 of notes and
$10,000 of stock, for example, the ratio would have been about six to
one - total debt of $62,000 and stock of $10,000. On these facts it is
conceivable that a court would refuse to honor the corporation's
notes if the mortgages had been assumed but would accept them at
face value if the corporation had simply taken the property subject
to the mortgages.
Another issue suggested by the Dobkin case is the extent to which
the courts will examine the validity of each class of debt independently.
If the organizers of the corporation had paid in $72,000 to cover the
entire cost of the property and then had taken back a first mortgage of
$44,000, notes of $26,000, and stock with a par or stated value of
$2,000, would the mortgage have been honored by the Tax Court?
The ratio of the mortgage to stock on these facts is twenty-two to one
($44,000 to $2,000), but the ratio of senior to junior investment is
eleven to seven ($44,000 to $28,000). Since the latter is the proper
ratio, it is hard to believe that the mortgage would be held to be the
equivalent of stock, even though the notes are vulnerable.
This suggests that a corporation might issue several classes of
junior securities to its shareholders, seeking to compel an independent
judgment on the validity of each class in turn. The corporation in
the Dobkin case, for example, might have issued to its shareholders in
14The findings of the court do not indicate whether the corporation assumed
the mortgages or purchased the property subject to them. The petitioner's brief,
however, states that the purchase price was $71,000, including a first mortgage of
$38,500 and a second mortgage of $4,250, which may imply that the mortgages were
assumed.
15But see Leonard J. Erickson, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1338 (1956), comparing
the fair market value of the corporation's equity in its property with the amount
of alleged debt owed to its shareholders.
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exchange for their $28,000 cash investment a $12,000 third mortgage,
an $8,000 fourth mortgage, $2,000 of debentures, $4,000 of notes, and
$2,000 of stock. It is possible on these facts that only the notes, or
only the notes and the debentures, would have been disqualified.
Courts have long had to draw such lines in deciding reasonable compensation cases; under section 535 (c) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 a similar judgment will have to be made in imposing the accumulated earnings tax. 16 In thin corporation cases involving a
series of advances by a shareholder to his corporation, the courts have
not ordinarily distinguished among advances of equal dignity, even
though some may have rested on a firmer foundation of equity investment than others.1 But so far the courts apparently have not been
confronted by a case in which the shareholders hold several classes of
alleged debt clearly labeled as such, and the question must still be
regarded as undecided. Unless the classes of debt are proliferated beyond normal business usage, they should not be lumped together for
condemnation en masse.
The Kelley case spoke of nominal stock investments as contrasted
with material amounts of capital invested in stock. Should the ratio
take into account earned surplus, paid-in surplus, and the like, or
should it be limited to amounts paid in that cannot be used for
dividends, that is, par or stated value? Since earned and paid-in
surplus can be paid out to shareholders, a lender interested in the ratio
of debt to stock might well disregard such accounts in determining
whether a loan would create an excessive debt structure. Conventional
financial analysis, however, is based on the ratio of liabilities to net
worth, a relationship that takes into account surplus accounts as well
as stated capital. 8 The Tax Court apparently agrees that surplus
l6Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930), provides another analogy.
'-At times the taxpayer's conduct has enabled the court to distinguish among
advances and to hold that some were capital and others were true debts. George
J. Schaefer, 24 T.C. 638 (1955), rev'd, 240 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1957); J. Terry Huffstutler, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1422 (1953). On other occasions the taxpayer has
conceded that some advances were capital contributions and has sought to salvage
only the balance. In John Wrather, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 345 (1955), it was
conceded that advances to promote and finance the organization of the corporation
were capital contributions, but a bad-debt deduction was claimed for later advances
used for material equipment and operating expenses. It is not necessarily the
earlier advances that are most vulnerable. If the corporation's fortunes are declining,
later advances might be treated as capital contributions even though the earlier
advances were beyond criticism.
ISMYER, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS 129-33, 195 (1946); Foulke, The Genesis
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accounts may be included to decide whether the corporation is adequately capitalized. 19
A related issue is whether the book value, the market value, or the
adjusted basis of the corporation's assets should be employed in determining the amount of capital invested by the shareholders. In
Swoby Corporation20 the Tax Court found "an obviously excessive
debt structure" when an office building worth "at least $250,200" was
transferred to a newly created corporation for a $250,000 debenture
and stock with an aggregate par value of $200. The court apparently
regarded market value as more relevant than book value in determining whether the ratio of debt to stock was excessive, but at the same
time it disregarded - though perhaps only for failure of proof - the
possibility that the value of the building was substantially more than
250,200. In another case,21 however, the Tax Court recognized that
"orders or unbilled items and goodwill" that had a substantial market
value could be given effect in determining the adequacy of a corporation's capital, although their adjusted basis was apparently either nominal or zero. And in Kraft Foods Company v. Commissioner22 the
court thought it "obvious that in the determination of debt-equity
ratios, real values rather than artificial par and book values should
be applied."
It was assumed in all of these cases that the values at the time the
alleged indebtedness was incurred are controlling, regardless of the
corporation's later financial history. It should not be surprising that
if the shareholders become bona fide creditors at the outset of the
venture they are not deprived of their status by the corporation's
later financial difficulties. But it is equally true that "debt" that
is a disguise for stock when issued is not purged by an improvement
in the corporation's fortunes. Under Bazley v. Commissioner23 stock
of the 14 Important Ratios 47 (Dun & Bradstreet 1955) (total debt to tangible net
worth); SEC Holding Co. Act Release No. 13255 (1956) (ratio of long-term debt to
capitalization and surplus; ratio of common stock equity, including surplus, to
capitalization and surplus).
19B. M. C. Mfg. Co., 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 376 (1952); see also Kraft Foods
Company v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1956); Earle v. W. J. Jones & Son,
Inc., 200 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1952).
209 T.C. 887 (1947).
2Ainslie Perrault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955); compare with R. M. Gunn, 25 T.C. 424
(1955) (no such unbooked assets); see also Sheldon Tauber, 24 T.C. 179 (1955).
2222 F.2d 118, 127 (2d Cir. 1956).
2331 U.S. 787 (1947); see also INT. Rxv. CODa or 1954, §854 (a) (2).
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can be upgraded to debt only if the shareholder reports dividend income; this rule would be undermined if a corporation at organization
could issue an excessive amount of bonds that would be transmuted
from stock to true bonds if the corporation proved successful.24
SALES OF DISHONORED SECURITIES

If corporate prosperity does not remove the taint from the shareholders' bonds or other obligations that were excessive in amount when
they were issued, what is the effect of a sale of such instruments by
shareholders to an outsider? Assume, for example, that the Dobkin
corporation became so successful that the shareholders could sell
their debentures to an insurance company or other institutional lender.
A host of troublesome and undecided questions would arise upon
such a sale. One approach would be to treat the instruments as though
they were shares of preferred stock. The sale would then produce
capital gain to the shareholders, their basis being computed under
section 358. The interest paid by the corporation to the new owners
would continue to be nondeductible, but they would be entitled to the
dividends-received credit. A retirement of the debentures would be
treated as a redemption of stock under section 302; it would probably
produce capital gain or loss to the new owners under section 302 (b) (1)
or section 302 (b) (3). The redemption would not affect the original
owners of the instruments at least if it was not contemplated or prearranged at the time they were sold.25 If the instruments can be
characterized as preferred stock, the original owners would be well
24This objection to upgrading is not applicable to a corporation having no earn-

ings and profits, since a distribution of debt instruments to its shareholders would
not be taxable as a dividend and would produce capital gain under INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §301 (c) (3) (A), only if its value exceeded the basis of their shares.
2
sSince retirement of the debentures would result in a taxable dividend to the
original owners, the government might assert that a sale followed by a prearranged
retirement should be treated as a disguised dividend. See Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1942). Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207
F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954), would be all
obstacle to this argument, though other courts might refuse to follow it. Even
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit might distinguish one prearranged redemption from another by reference to the length of time between sale and redemption. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §306, does not reach preferred stock issued in
a §851 transaction, but it does not necessarily follow that the Chamberlin case was
thereby endorsed as to a later sale of such stock in conjunction with a prearranged
redemption.
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advised to sell them, since a sale might avoid the dividend tax that
would be imposed if they were held until retirement.
The instruments do not, however, automatically become preferred
stock simply because they are held not to be evidences of bona fide indebtedness. Loans by shareholders to thin corporations are sometimes labeled by the courts "contributions" to capital; the implication is that the instruments evidencing the loans are to be totally disregarded. If this rationale were pursued logically, there would be no
offsetting basis and the entire proceeds of a sale of the instruments by
the shareholders would be taxable as ordinary income rather than
capital gain, since the phantom instruments would not be "property"
within the meaning of the capital asset definition of section 1221. On
the other hand, the instruments presumably would come to life in
the hands of the transferees, but whether they would be characterized
as shares of preferred stock or as authentic evidences of indebtedness
is unclear. They might be characterized as evidences of indebtedness
so far as the new owners are concerned, that is, so as to deny the dividends-received credit and to bring a retirement within the terms of
section 1232, even though the corporation was denied the interest
deduction.
SALES TO THIN CORPORATIONS

Most thin corporation cases fall into one of two patterns: (1) A
newly organized corporation issues a nominal amount of stock and
an excessive amount of bonds or notes to its promoters, pro rata, in a
section 351 exchange; or (2) a corporation launched with inadequate
capital borrows from its shareholders to meet financial demands that
might have been foreseen when it was organized.
Litigation during the last two years indicates that a third pattern
is taking shape: the purchase of business assets from its shareholders by
an undercapitalized corporation. For example, assume that two
partners organize a new corporation, paying $2,000 for common stock
with a par or stated value of $2,000. They then sell their partnership
assets, which have an adjusted basis of $100,000 and a fair market value
of $120,000, to the corporation. The sales price is $120,000, to be paid
in sixty monthly installments of $2,000 each, with interest; and the
corporation issues sixty negotiable notes to the partners to evidence
its obligations under the contract. By this plan they hope to lay the
basis for interest -deductions by the corporation as well as for withdrawals of corporate profits in the form of payments on the purchase
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price of the assets. They recognize that if the stock and notes had
been issued in exchange for the assets in a section 351 transaction the
notes would probably be treated as the equivalent of stock, thus causing the interest deductions to be disallowed and payment of the notes
to be taxed as a dividend. In addition to avoiding the perils of the
thin corporation, the sale is designed to give the corporation a basis
for the transferred assets equal to their fair market value; in the case
of plant, machinery, and equipment this will increase the depreciation
deducted from ordinary income, although the partners' gain on the
sale of these assets to the corporation will be taxed only as capital
gain.2 6 Moreover, by electing to report their profit on the installment
basis, the partners can recognize it in easy stages over a period of time.
An obvious hazard of the plan is that the puchase of the stock by
the partners for cash and their sale of the assets may be telescoped
by the courts into a single transaction: an exchange of property for
stock or securities under section 351. This in itself would not be a
serious threat to the plan, since if the short-term installment notes
constituted "boot" rather than securities the partners would recognize
gain on the exchange and the basis of the assets would be increased
just as was contemplated. Furthermore, if the notes were recognized
as "boot," the corporation would presumably be allowed to deduct its
interest payments and the payment of the notes when due would not
constitute a dividend to the partners.
Once the sale is regarded as a section 351 transaction, however,
the whole plan falls into the classic pattern of the thin corporation:
the issue by a newly organized corporation of an excessive amount of
debt against a nominal equity base. If the notes are thus transmuted
into stock, the interest deduction will be disallowed and payments on
the notes will constitute dividends to the shareholders. The transfer
itself would then be a tax-free exchange, but the corporation would
have to carry over the partners' basis for the assets. Several judicial
decisions have already adopted this approach. 27 In these cases the
261f the seller owns directly or constructively more than 80% in value of the
corporation's stock, however, his gain is taxed as ordinary income. INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §1239.
27Houck v. Hinds, 215 F.2d 673 (10th Cir. 1954); R. M. Gunn, 25 T.C. 424 (1955);
Herbert B. Miller, 24 T.C. 923 (1955). reversed, 239 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1956) (on the
ground that the corporation was not thin and that the parties intended to create
genuine debt); see also Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. No. 4 (1956). The theory of these
decisions might have been adopted in two earlier cases, in which sales to undercapitalized corporations were given effect, but apparently the thin capitalization
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sale followed so promptly upon the creation of the corporation that
the two operations could easily be regarded as one integrated transaction; consequently, the courts were not faced with the question of
how to treat an independent sale to an undercapitalized corporation
that had been in existence for some time. Such a sale might be
treated either (1) as a disguised section 351 transaction, in which
property was transferred in exchange for "securities" that were the
equivalent of stock, or (2) as a contribution to capital.2 8
In addition to the cases holding that a sale was an integral part of
29
a section 351 transaction, the Tax Court has decided two other cases
in which the sale was honored because the corporation was not too thin.
GUARANTEED LOANS AS SOLUTION

It has recently been announced that guaranteed loans "should
wholly eliminate the problem of thin incorporation. 30 The technique
recommended is that the corporation borrow from a bank or other
outside lender rather than from its shareholders, and that the shareholders guarantee payment of the loans. The proponent of this plan
apparently is convinced that the periodic payments made by the
corporation to the bank or other lender for use of the funds would
be deductible as interest under section 163 and that repayment of the
issue was not raised. Hollywood, Inc., 10 T.C. 175 (1948); Herff & Dittmar Land Co.,
32 B.T.A. 349 (1935). In Sun Properties, Inc., v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th
Cir. 1955), the Court of Appeals gave effect to a sale by a sole shareholder to his
undercapitalized corporation, adhering to its rejection of the thin corporation doc-

trine.
2sIf the "sale" is regarded as a contribution to capital, the theory of the district
court whose decision was reversed in Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, supra
note 27, the evidences of indebtedness received by the shareholders would presumably be disregarded rather than taxed as a §301 distribution.
29Ainslie Perrault, 25 T.C. 439 (1955); Sheldon Tauber, 24 T.C. 179 (1955).
The Tauber case bears witness to the novelty of the problem of sales to undercapitalized corporations: the court said "there was here no 'thin' capitalization, although the importance of 'thin' capitalization in this case is not readily apparent."
Id. at 183. Its importance became apparent only 7 months later, however, when the
Tax Court decided R. M. Gunn, supra note 27.
sOLutz, Capital Formation of Speculative Enterprises, 34 TAXES 420, 423 (1956).
See also Fuller, Tax Results of Stockholder Advances and Guaranty Payments, 29
TUL. L. Rxv. 775 (1955). For skeptidsm of the proposition that guaranteed loans
will eliminate the problem of thin capitalization see Holzman, The Current Trend in
Guaranty Cases: An Impetus to Thin-Corporation?, 11 TAX L. Rav. 29 (1955);
Note, 5 TAX L. REv.424 (1950).
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borrowed funds by the corporation would not constitute a dividend
to the shareholders.
This recommendation of guaranteed loans as a solution of the
problems of the thin corporation underestimates the perspicacity of
the courts. Just as a "bond" is not necessarily a bond, so a "guaranteed
loan" is not necessarily a guaranteed loan, a "lender" is not necessarily
a lender, and a "guarantor" is not necessarily a guarantor. In form
the bank may have lent money to the corporation upon the guaranty
of the shareholders; but in substance the bank may have made the loan
to the shareholders, who in turn passed the funds on to the corporation
as - perish the thought - a capital contribution. If the transaction is
recast in this fashion, payments by the corporation to the bank whether labeled "interest" or "repayment of loan" - would serve to
discharge obligations of the shareholders to the bank and thus would
be disguised dividends if covered by earnings and profits, while if the
corporation became insolvent the shareholders' losses would be deducted under section 165 (g) as worthless stock rather than under
section 166 as business or nonbusiness bad debts. 31
As yet there are no cases directly on this point, but courts have
in the past recognized that a guaranteed loan may be something other
than it appears to be. In E. J.Ellisberg32 the court refused to allow
a fond father to deduct a loss arising from the guaranty of his son's
debt. The son, to finance a business, had borrowed from a bank on
notes endorsed by the father, who was compelled to make them good
when the son's business failed. On the ground that there was no
reasonable expectation when the father guaranteed the debt that
the son would pay the bank or reimburse his father, the court held
the transaction equivalent to one in which a father borrows money
and in effect makes a gift of the proceeds to his son. The theory that
the endorser of a note is, for tax purposes, the borrower can be applied with equal cogency if the shareholders of a corporation endorse
its notes. When the corporation is too weak to borrow on its own
credit and the lender looks primarily to the secondary party and only
secondarily, if at all, to the primary party, the courts may well say to
the endorser, "You, not the corporation, are the borrower."3 The
31A guarantor's loss is deducted as a bad debt under Putnam v. Commissioner,
77 Sup. Ct. 175 (1956); before this decision the prevailing view was that the guarantor
suffered an ordinary loss, deductible under §165 (a) and (c). Pollak v.Commissioner, 209 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1954); Fox v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101 (2d Cir. 1951).
329 T.C. 463 (1947).
33My colleague Wesley A. Sturges has called my attention to a line of cases in
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consequences would be that the corporation's payments to the bank,
whether in payment of interest or of principal, would be taxed to the
shareholders as disguised dividends, and they, rather than the corporation, would be entitled to the interest deduction.
In the Ellisberg case, to be sure, the endorser's veil was pierced
only after the court found that the son, the ostensible borrower, was
without resources and likely never to have any. When a corporation
borrows funds on notes endorsed by its shareholders, the expectation
of the parties is that the corporation will be successful enough to pay
off the borrowed funds itself. But this is equally true when the shareholders make loans directly to a thin corporation; the intent to have
the corporation pay off the loans is regarded as no more than an intent
to have the corporation pay dividends. An intention to repay them
out of corporate profits does not make them loans by the bank to
the corporation. They can in appropriate circumstances be regarded
as loans by the bank to the shareholders, the proceeds of which are
used by the shareholders to make capital contributions to the corporation; the intention to apply corporate profits to their repayment can
be regarded as no more than an intention to pay disguised dividends if
the corporation's business permits.
If a direct loan by a shareholder to his corporation would constitute a capital contribution because the corporation is too thin, it
would be rash to assume that a guaranteed loan to the same corporation would pass muster. 34 It might get by once or twice because of
its novelty, but in the long run the results will probably be disappointing.
the law of suretyship in which an ostensible maker of a note is held to be a guarantor. In many states a married woman cannot become surety for her husband;
to protect whatever policy the statute embodies, the courts on occasion look beyond the form of the instrument in order to hold that a married woman who purported to act as maker is in reality a guarantor. See STuRGES, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CImrr TRANSACTIONS 8-14 (4th ed. 1955). This transformation is the converse

of that suggested in the text.
34One reason given by the Supreme Court for its holding in Putnam v. Commissioner, 77 Sup. Ct. 175 (1956), that the guarantor's loss is deductible as a bad
debt was: "There is no real or economic difference between the loss of an investment
made in the form of a direct loan to a corporation and one made indirectly in the

form of a guaranteed bank loan. The tax consequences should in all reason be the
same ....

" Id. at 180. Whatever justification there may be for treating loan and

guarantees differently if the corporation is adequately capitalized, a shareholder who
guarantees the loans of his undercapitalized corporation must be prepared to hear
this language of the Putnam case quoted against him.
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PERMANENT CAPITAL STRUCTURE -

A

CLOUD ON THE HORIZON?

Until recently it was ordinarily assumed that if a new corporation
issued bonds and stock to its organizers in exchange for business assets
the bonds, if valid on their face and not excessive in amount, would
be recognized as such even though they were issued for fixed assets
or other property necessary to the conduct of the business. There is
a judicial trend, however, toward the conclusion that bonds and other
evidences of indebtedness are not bona fide if issued to the corporation's
shareholders in exchange for assets required to get the business under
way.35 The6 Tax Court expressed this view quite explicitly in Herbert
B. Miller:3
35

1n Sam Schnitzer, 13 T.C. 43, 61 (1949), the Tax Court said of certain advances
to a newly organized corporation: "Substantially all . . . had apparently been invested in the corporation's organization and plant, a permanent asset. Advances for
such a purpose are by their very nature placed at the risk of the business ...."
See also B. P. Gale, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 518 (1956); Joseph Verney Reed, 14
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 455 (1955) ("Thus, these advances were necessary to establish
new businesses and partake more of the nature of capital than loans"); Hubbard,
11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 958 (1953) ("considering that the money was essential in
the businesses, there has been no adequate explanation for limiting the capital stock
to $50,000 and accounting for the balance transferred as alleged debts to the petitioners"). In Warren H. Brown, 27 T.C. No. 3 (1956), the government argued
that a sale of assets by shareholders to their corporation should be treated as a
contribution to capital because the corporation could not have operated without
the assets in question. The Tax Court rejected this argument because the record
established that even without the assets the corporation could have operated as a
sales and marketing outlet, with other assets of substantial value that it had received
in a transaction under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §112(b) (5). Although it refrained
from endorsing the government's theory that essential assets cannot be sold to a
corporation by its shareholders, the Tax Court passed up an opportunity to reject
the theory. In Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955), holding that
certain advances by shareholders to their corporation were bona fide debt, the court
made an italicized point of the fact that the advances were for "working capital"
(not, it will be noted, purchase of capital assets), and it distinguished other cases
in which the alleged "advances" were "made for acquisition of capital assets" (but
see the court's footnote 5) or constituted "initial funds to start the corporate life."
See also Sun Properties, Inc. v. United States, 220 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1955).
3624 T.C. 923, 929 (1955). As the first sentence of this extract indicates, the case
could easily have been disposed of on the ground that the stock investment was
nominal and the debt excessive. But the court chose to use language that has implications far beyond the run-of-the-mill thin corporation case, regardless of whether
it intended to rest its judgment on a broader ground. The Tax Court's decision was
reversed by the court of appeals on grounds that do not seem to destroy the import
of this discussion. See note 27 supra.
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"The contributions which petitioner contends created an indebtedness constituted substantially everything the corporation
owned and which it required in order to commence doing business and to remain in business. It was at all times intended that
the value of such contributions should remain indefinitely at
the risk of the going business as part of its permanent capital.
structure. To be sure, the partners undoubtedly expected, as
contended by petitioner, earnings to be sufficiently high that in
a relatively short time they would be able to withdraw sums approximating in amount their original capital investment without impairing necessary capital; and subsequent events seem to
prove this expectation to have been justified. This, however,
does not alter the fact that everything transferred to the corporation in May and June of 1946 was intended to remain therein
as part of its permanent capital structure; only surplus earnings,
to be subsequently acquired as a result of successful operations
of the business, were in fact intended to be withdrawn."
Why this stress on the fact that the notes were issued by the corporation to its shareholders in exchange for assets that were necessary to
the conduct of the business and "intended to be part of its permanent
capital structure" or, as other cases 37 have put it, for "a permanent
asset," "to establish new businesses," for "money essential in the business," "for acquisition of capital assets," or for "funds to start the
corporate life"? It seems clear that the courts do not intend to deny
the validity of bonds or notes issued to outsiders in payment for fixed
assets. To be sure, an outside creditor might insist on reclaiming the
assets, foreclosing his lien or levying execution on the corporation's
property if the debt is not paid, whatever the cost to the corporation,
while a shareholder-creditor would ordinarily act more leniently. s3 The
37See note 35 supra.

38Even a shareholder-creditor, however, may levy on the corporation's property
in extreme circumstances, that is, to share with other creditors in a distribution or

to impress a superior lien on the assets. Indeed, the "Deep Rock" doctrine applied so
frequently in bankruptcy and reorganization cases takes as its starting point the

effort of a parent corporation to collect a claim from its subsidiary. Taylor v.
Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939). See also BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS
301-03 (rev. ed. 1946).
The fact that a shareholder was recognized as a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding was one of the reasons for treating his advances as bona fide debt in J. B.
Reilly, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 22 (1955).
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Tax Court may have had this distinction in mind in the Miller case,
since it went on to say: 39
"Although the notes in form are absolute, and call for fixed
payments, we have no doubt, from a reading of the entire
record, that no payment was ever intended or would ever be
made or demanded which would in any way weaken or undermine the business."
If the test of indebtedness employed by the Tax Court is, as this
extract suggests, the creditor's willingness to push the borrower to the
wall, the case falls into line with several other recent Tax Court cases,
to be discussed below, refusing to honor bonds and notes held by
shareholders of the issuing corporation when the court detected an
absence of intent to enforce them rigorously against the corporation.
But if the weakness in the notes was that they were owned by presumptively generous shareholders, the deficiency did not arise from
the permanent character of the assets for which they were issued.
Notes would suffer from the same deficiency if issued by the corporation to its shareholders for inventory, for working capital, or even in
payment for a block of football tickets.
The "permanent capital structure" language is often accompanied
by an equally puzzling use of the term "risk of the business," which
has been popular in the Tax Court at least since 1949, when it said
of certain advances to a newly organized corporation by its shareholders: "Substantially all . . . had apparently been invested in the
corporation's organization and plant, a permanent asset. Advances
for such a purpose are by their very nature placed at the risk of the
business."4

0

The statement is puzzling because all of the corporation's assets plant, equipment, inventory, cash, unrelated investments, and the
like - are at the risk of the business in the sense that unpaid creditors
may seize them (unless they are encumbered by liens). If a shareholder's advances constitute a contribution to capital because the
assets acquired are subject to levy by other creditors, only advances
that are promptly used to pay salaries and wages, taxes, and similar
claims are immune from attack. Yet it is hard to assign any reason
why advances for the one purpose should be more vulnerable than
3924 T. C. 923, 930 (1955).
4oSam Schnitzer, 13 T.C. 43, 61 (1949).
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advances for the other. Moreover, in some cases the Tax Court appears to be saying that advances are contributions to capital because
the assets acquired thereby were placed at the risk of the business;
in other cases it appears to be speaking of the liability side, rather
than the asset side, of the corporation's balance sheet. 41 In Miller,
for example, the Tax Court referred to the shareholders' intention
that their "contributions should remain indefinitely at the risk of the
going business." 42 The court seems to be saying either that the shareholders' investment was not to be repaid or that it would be subordinated to the claims of other creditors. In this sense the phrase "risk
of the business" is simply another label for contribution to capital and
does not aid in determining whether the loans fall into this category
or are bona fide.
MUST THE CREDITOR BE A SHYLOCK?

The Miller case is not the first opinion in which the Tax Court
has recognized that a shareholder of a corporate borrower may not be
as authentic a Shylock as an outside lender. In Gooding Amusement
Company43 it was held that notes issued by a corporation to its shareholders did not create a debtor-creditor relationship, although they
were normal both in form and amount, because the dominant shareholder, who with his family owned all the notes and at the outset all
the stock, had "no intention at the time of the issuance of the notes
ever to enforce payment of his notes, especially if to do so would
either impair the credit rating of the corporation, cause it to borrow
from other sources the funds necessary to meet the payments, or bring
about its dissolution." 44 The court, supporting this conclusion by
41The same ambiguity of reference is found in the use of the term "permanent
capital structure" by the Tax Court. In the Miller case, for example, the court
refers first to contributions as being part of the corporation's permanent capital
structure, while at another point assets are so described.
4224 T.C. 923, 930 (1955).
4323 T.C. 408 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1956). Rabin, The "Clifford
Case" of the Thin Corporation,34 TAxEs 282, 283 (1956), asserts in regard to this
case: "Under the court's reasoning, it would be virtually impossible for any closed
corporation to issue bonds or notes to its stockholders whether at the time of incorporation or subsequent to its incorporation." The author's alarm is made more
impressive by his conclusion, only two years earlier, that "the thinly organized
corporation is far from being extinct as a sound tax-planning measure and, -when
properly organized, can yield rich dividends indeed." Rabin, Fat Advantages of the
Thin Corporation,32 TAXEs 572, 574 (1954).
4423 T.C. 408, 418 (1955). The same thought is found in other Tax Court
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taking advantage of hindsight, pointed to the corporation's failure to
pay most of the notes at maturity45 and to the fact that they were subordinated, apparently by an agreement after issuance, to the claims
of certain other creditors.
There were other factors upon which the court relied, including
the lack of any purpose other than tax avoidance in issuing the notes,
but most of its reasoning could be applied with equal cogency to notes
or bonds issued to shareholders by any corporation owned by one
man or one harmonious family. Of course the shareholders might want
notes or bonds in order to lay the basis for a preferred status in the
event of the corporation's bankruptcy. But this intent means only
that the shareholder will seek to salvage whatever he can if the
corporation fails, not that he will take the initiative, as an outsider
might, in pushing the corporation to the wall for any default. It seems
to follow that the determination of the shareholder's intent, or, as the
court put it in the Miller case, their state of mind at the time the bonds
or notes are issued, is not so much a finding of fact as an irrebuttable
presumption or inference drawn from the shareholder-corporation
relationship.
The theory that a shareholder cannot be a creditor of his corporation unless he is the psychological equivalent of an independent lender
is to be contrasted with the more traditional view that he may be a
creditor if the terms of the instrument, the ratio of debt to stock, and
other objective circumstances are comparable to those that would
have prevailed had the corporation borrowed from an independent
lender. 46 The recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Second
cases, e.g., Isidor Dobkin, 15 T.C. 31, 34 (1950): "[T]here was no evidence that
petitioner or any of his associates ever demanded repayment of their purported
loans or that they ever contemplated such repayment unless the enterprise proved
so profitable that they could withdraw the major part of their original investment
without impairing the corporation's working capital."
45in Earle v. W. J. Jones & Co., 200 F.2d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 1952), however, the
court said of a failure by shareholders to enforce payment of notes issued to them
by their corporation: "[T]he same strict insistence upon payment on the due date
as would be the case if a bank were the creditor should not be expected where a
shareholder, or one who is closely identified therewith, is a creditor." This fact,
the candid recognition of which resulted in Earle v. W. J. Jones & Co., supra, being
cited with approval in Bakhaus and Burke, Inc., 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 919 (1955),
was the very reason why the court believed that there was no intent to create a debt
in the Gooding Amusement Co. case!
4"See, e.g., Toledo Blade Co., 11 T.C. 1079, 1084 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 180
F.2d 357 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950): "Under their terms, the de-
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Circuit in the Kraft Foods case neatly illustrates these two approaches.
The majority, reversing the Tax Court, upheld an interest deduction
claimed by a subsidiary corporation for payments on debentures owned
by its parent largely because they bore the formal indicia of debt and
were not excessive in amount: 47
"In a broad economic sense, of course, it is of limited significance what form a sole stockholder's investment in a whollyowned corporation takes. That is equally true of any transaction or arrangement between affiliates, whether it be an
operating contract, a sale, a lease, or a payment of interest or
dividends. But the law generally and the applicable tax law
deliberately, through its insistence on taxing affiliates separately,
affords significance to and honors the type of investment chosen.
In consequence, all legitimate and genuine corporation-stockholder arrangements have legal - and hence economic - significance, and must be respected in so far as the rights of third
parties, including the tax collector, are concerned."
Judge Clark, dissenting, would have denied the deduction on the
ground that the Tax Court was justified in finding that a genuine
debtor-creditor relationship did not exist between the two corporations. In his view the record revealed a "lack of indebtedness in the
ordinary sense, i.e., a debt whose nonpayment leads to foreclosure or
attachment and execution."48 By this Judge Clark may have meant
that foreclosure would be an idle gesture because the parent's daim
would be subordinated to outside creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding,4s but it is more probable that his conclusion rested on an inference that the parent corporation would probably voluntarily exbentures were absolute as to the payment of both principal and interest. Had they
been issued to a nonproprietary purchaser for value there could have been no question as to their genuineness. The fact that they were issued to the petitioner's sole
stockholder in exchange for a portion of the interest represented by its stockholdings
in the petitioner does not affect their validity ...
47232 F.2d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1956).
481d. at 128, 129.
49The Tax Court found that "on the facts here the petitioner, for all practical
purposes, was a department of National Dairy ...." Kraft Foods Co., 21 T.C. 519,
599 (1954). But the court did not explicitly find that the parent's claim would be
subordinated in bankruptcy, despite its application of the term of art "incorporated
department" to the subsidiary, and it would be quite an extension of the "Deep
Rock" doctrine to subordinate on the facts found by the Tax Court.
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tend the subsidiary's time for payment or subordinate its debentures
rather than foreclose even if its priority were indisputable.5 The latter
prediction would often prove to be correct, no doubt, though it is
hazardous to guess whether a parent corporation will, in a time of
economic stress, prefer to abandon its common stock interest in a
subsidiary and seek to enforce its debentures; the "Deep Rock" doctrine exists only because parent corporations sometimes have sought
to play the role of creditors. 51
Consequently, although the Tax Court purported to look to all
the facts in stating that "we are not convinced that the creation of a
debt or of a debtor-creditor relationship between . . . [the parent
corporation] and petitioner under the claimed debentures was ever
intended .. ..52 it is hard to escape the conviction that the one paramount fact was that the creditor was the parent of the debtor. This
one fact would almost always not merely permit but require the conclusion - to use the Tax Court's language in the Gooding Amusement
Company case - that the creditor had no "intention at the time of
the issuance of the [obligations] ever to enforce payment ... especially
if to do so would either impair the credit rating of the corporation,
cause it to borrow from other sources the funds necessary to meet
the payments, or bring about its dissolution." 53 Or, to use Judge Clark's
language, the parent-subsidiary relation would almost necessarily
lead to the conclusion of a "lack of indebtedness in the ordinary sense,
i.e., a debt whose nonpayment leads to foreclosure or attachment and
execution ....,4
50Judge Clark thought that the majority had opened "a Pandora's box for the
future" and that the success of the taxpayer would stimulate imitators. But the
only way to keep the box shut and to prevent attempts by subsidiaries to deduct
interest on debts owed to their parents is to lay down a rule of law that such debts
will not be recognized. If the Tax Court's conclusion that there was no debtorcreditor relationship between Kraft Foods Company and National Dairy was only
a finding of fact that no such relationship was intended because of the trivial
details mentioned in the Tax Court's opinion, other taxpayers could easily vary
the facts sufficiently to avoid the fate of Kraft Foods Company. Judge Clark must
have meant, therefore, that the parent-subsidiary relationship alone was enough
to bar the deduction. In this way Pandora's box has been closed on claims for
losses on certain sales between affiliated persons. See INT. REV. COnE Or 1954,
§267 (a) (1).
51lSee note 38 supra.
5221 T.C. 513, 598 (1954).
5323 T.C. 408, 418 (1955).
54232 F.2d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1956).
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Although the Tax Court's decision in the Kraft Foods Company
case was reversed, it is most unlikely that we have heard the last of its
approach in that case; and it is interesting to speculate on the extent
to which the Tax Court would have carried its conclusion that the
subsidiary was only an incorporated department of the parent. The
parent, according to the findings of the Tax Court, followed a practice
of making inventory loans to its subsidiaries, on which interest was
charged, payable in the ordinary course of business within one year.
Is the interest on such loans deductible by the subsidiary? Assuming
that the loans were seasonal and were always repaid when the inventory was sold by the subsidiary, would they thereby be distinguished
from the debentures? Or could it be said, with equal accuracy, that
they did not constitute debts "whose nonpayment leads to foreclosure
or attachment and execution"?
If the parent corporation pays the overhead expenses of the entire
system -national office rent and salaries, legal and accounting fees,
and the like - and then allocates these expenses among its subsidiaries, can the subsidiary's reimbursement be treated as a disguised
dividend on the ground that the parent's payment of the subsidiary's
share of the expense was a contribution to the subsidiary's capital? Is
the parent's claim against the subsidiary for reimbursement of such
expenses "a debt whose nonpayment leads to foreclosure or attachment
and execution"? If the parent purported to lease equipment or real
estate to the subsidiary, could the subsidiary be denied a deduction for
its payments of rent on the ground that they were not truly required
to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession of the
property, since nonpayment would probably not lead to eviction? 5 If
the subsidiary purports to sell its output to the parent corporation,
can the transfer of the manufactured product by the subsidiary be
treated as a dividend to the parent and the parent's payments to the
subsidiary as contributions to the subsidiary's capital?
The traditional answer to all these questions is that the subsidiary,
if adequately capitalized, and the parent may deal with each other as
55

In Multnomah Operating Co., P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec. J56,012 at 56-169,
the Tax Court said of a controversy over certain payments labeled "rent": "The
test, of course, lies in the answer to the question as to the likelihood or probability
of an interruption in petitioner's use of such property in case it should default
in such payments." After saying this, however, the court allowed the petitioner to
deduct the payments in question as compensation, although it was as unrealistic
to infer that nonpayment would have led to suspension of the services as to infer
that it would have resulted in eviction from the leased premises.
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they would with outsiders. In the case of an alleged loan, for example,
the fact that it is enforceable against the subsidiary is sufficient; no
attempt is made to predict whether the parent on maturity would be
more willing than an outsider to extend the time or to subordinate its
claim. Similarly, a lease is ordinarily upheld if its terms are comparable
to those that would be arranged between unrelated persons, even
though eviction for nonpayment of rent is unlikely in the extreme. A
parent can include, in computing its costs of goods sold, payments
to a subsidiary for its manufactured products without proving that
failure to pay the agreed price would impel the subsidiary to sue
the parent for breach of contract. Likewise, a corporation can deduct
compensation paid to its sole shareholder without proving that he
would sulk in his tent and refuse to work if the salary were not paid.
In honoring such transactions the courts do not have to hold that
insiders can be genuine outsiders, although at times they may talk as
though such an exchange of roles were possible.
What the Tax Court would say about these transactions, in view of
its approach in the Kraft Foods Company, Gooding Amusement Company, and Miller cases, is doubtful. Although the logic of these decisions would lead to a denial of the validity of all parent-subsidiary
transactions, 56 it is inconceivable that logic would be pursued so inexorably. It may be predicted that day-to-day sales and similar dealings
between subsidiary and parent are in no danger of attack so long as
the corporations are adequately capitalized, the formalities are observed, and the terms of the agreement are similar to those that might
be arranged between outsiders. But as to long-term arrangements,
such as loans and leases, it seems unlikely that we have heard the last
of the Miller theory that a debt is not a debt if "no payment was ever
intended or would ever be made or demanded which would in any
way weaken or undermine the business." If this criterion of validity
were applied consistently, however, it would invalidate virtually all
loans by parent corporations to their subsidiaries; consequently it is
doubtful that the Tax Court is ready to erect its approach into a rule
of law. Among other objections to such an inflexible rule, the Internal
Revenue Code itself at many points recognizes directly or by implication the validity of parent-subsidiary debts and other similar transactions.
56The Internal Revenue Service itself is obviously not prepared to go this far.
See Rev. Rul. 523, 1956 Ctm. BULL -........- holding that notes issued by a subsidiary
corporation to its parent to satisfy inter-company debts may be taken into account
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The approach that seems more likely is a series of case-by-case decisions, in which impalpable differences will be seized upon to distinguish valid debts from contributions to capital. The family partnership cases come to mind, although there at least the courts were endeavoring to probe into the parent's intentions toward members of
the family who might at some time exhibit a spirit of independence,
while in the parent-subsidiary loan cases the intent under investigation is the parent's intent to act like Shylock toward its wholly owned
subsidiary.
In the Kraft Foods Company case the subsidiary was wholly owned
by a single corporation, and in the Gooding Amusement Company case
the Tax Court spoke of the complete identity of interest among the
three shareholder-creditors: husband, wife, and infant daughter. In
the Miller case the debtor corporation was owned by three brothers.
If there is a single shareholder or if all the shareholders are bound by
a family tie, one may say with some conviction that the debtor will
probably not be faced with a foreclosure or execution sale by its shareholders if the debt is not paid at maturity, unless they must act to
prevent outside creditors from gaining a preferred position. But
if the debtor is owned by several unrelated shareholders, it is always
possible that their initial unity will crumble and that one will insist
upon payment of the debt at maturity and thereby force the others
to take a similar step to protect their separate interests. This possibility,
in turn, suggests that the Tax Court might be less willing to find that
"no payment was ever intended or would ever be made or demanded
which would in any way weaken or undermine the business" if the
debtor were owned by several unrelated shareholders than if it were
owned by a single shareholder or a family.

in computing the subsidiary's "borrowed capital" for excess profits tax purposes.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol10/iss1/2
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